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Ι. Introduction 
After thanking the organizers of this Conference for their kind invitation, which is a 
great honor to me, I would like to say that I am in the uncomfortable position of having to 
counter the respectable arguments of Professor Efi Kounougeri-Manoledaki, whose papers 
have inspired me to focus on the issue of genetic material donor disclosure. I admired the 
moderation of her arguments, a characteristic of wise teachers, who know very well that there 
is no absolute truth1 in the gray zones of bioethics and that we only become wiser by 
exchanging our views.  
 In this presentation, I will not repeat my previous research on why a child has the right 
to know the donor’s identity2. Instead, I will limit myself to proving that children have the 
right to access any information related to their person and, consequently, to information on 
the donor of their genetic material. Furthermore, I will analyze the issues arising from 
different national legislation in relation to the right of genetic material donor disclosure, thus 
stressing the need for a uniform approach to the matter. 
ΙI. The ownership status of data   
 In order to decide on access rights, it is crucial to answer the question of who owns the 
data obtained from genetic material analysis.  
Α. The legal nature of data 
Before investigating the ownership status of data, it would be appropriate to consider 
the legal nature of the data to which access is requested. This type of information has three 
aspects, as it is related to the genetic material donor, to the recipient (parent) and to the child 
                                                 
∗I would like to thank Κ. Ν. Christodoulou, Associate Professor of the Law Faculty of the University of Athens 
for our very fruitful debates. 
1 E.Kounougeri - Manoledaki, an opponent of disclosing the genetic material donor’s identity, very aptly accepts 
that “the arguments put forward by both sides are numerous and strong […], no participant to these debates can 
be absolutely satisfied by his/her arguments”. See E.Kounougeri - Manoledaki, Artificial insemination and Civil 
Law: The Draft Law on “Medical assistance in human reproduction”, in: E.Kounougeri - Manoledaki (ed.), 
Artificial insemination and genetic engineering: The ethical and legal dimension, Northern Greece Law Society, 
Sakkoula Publications, Athens-Thessaloniki 2003, p. 85 et seq. (95). 
2 See F. Panagopoulou-Koutnatzi, The right of genetic material donor disclosure, in: M. Kanellopoulou-Mpoti/F. 
Panagopoulou-Koutnatzi (ed.), Bioethical Reflections, Papazisi Publications, Athens 2014, p. 199-
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being born. The donor’s participation in the reproductive process through heterologous 
artificial insemination is a medical act and, therefore, it must be regarded, in the broader 
sense, as falling within the scope of health data and, in particular, of sensitive personal data 
within the meaning of Article 2(b) of Law 2472/1997. In addition, the fact that an individual 
may not be able to procreate naturally and may, therefore, resort to heterologous artificial 
reproduction methods, e.g. due to a medical condition, must be regarded as falling within the 
scope of health data and, consequently, of sensitive personal data within the meaning of 
Article 2(b) of Law 2472/1997. Finally, information on a person’s origins is regarded as 
genetic data. This type of data may provide information as to the health status, predisposition 
to diseases or ethnic origin and, for this reason, it would be more appropriate to assume that 
these data fall within the category of sensitive personal data3. 
 The inclusion of this information in the category of sensitive personal data is not 
devoid of practical meaning, as it reflects the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of 
such data and providing the ability to lift such confidentiality for serious reasons. It is true 
that large stakeholders, such as insurance companies, employers etc., would like to have 
access to genetic data and, therefore, it is of utmost importance to ensure the confidentiality of 
this information.  
 Finally, given that genetic data are connected to many different individuals4, they may 
be reasonably characterized as data items with multiple connections.  
                                                 
3 See Hellenic Data Protection Authority, Decision 29/2012, available at: www.dpa.gr, accessed on: 14.2.2015. 
In this decision, the Authority accepts that, regardless of the special characterization of STR genetic loci as 
sensitive or simple personal data, their publication  in a web page -even when such data remain published for a 
short period of time, in view of the fact that they may be stored, further processed and subsequently republished -
undermines the right to privacy and, therefore, it should have been made upon authorization by the Authority, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 7( 2) of Law 2472/1997. However, due to the controversial views of 
the scientific community as regards the use of the informational value of STR genetic loci, the Authority 
imposed no administrative sanctions for the failure to obtain an authorization by the Authority. Note that 
decision No 44/2009 of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority, which was repealed on formal grounds (by 
means of Decision No 73/2011 of the Authority) (both available at www.dpa.gr, accessed on: 14.2.2015) had 
accepted that the STR genetic analysis must be regarded as sensitive personal data on health and/or racial or 
ethnic origin, in accordance with the provisions of Article 2(b) of Law 2472/1997. According to Opinion 
15/2011 of the Supreme Court Prosecutor, Α.Kontaxis, available at: 
http://eisap.gr/sites/default/files/consulations/gnom2011_0015.pdf, accessed on: 14.2.2015, genetic data are 
sensitive personal data. I.D. Igglezakis, Sensitive Personal Data, Sakkoula Publications, Athens-Thessaloniki 
2004, p. 209, clearly states that genetic data fall within the category of medical data, i.e. sensitive data. The 
proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection 
Regulation), available at:http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_el.pdf, 
25 January 2012, accessed on: 14.2.2015 recognizes the particular nature of genetic data, by placing them under 
special personal data categories. At the same time, Article 33(2) includes genetic and biometric data into the 
processing operations which are likely to present specific risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects by 
virtue of their nature, their scope or their purposes. 






Β. Data ownership-determination rights 
 It is very important to resolve the issue of data ownership, as it will allow for the 
practical identification of the data owner and, therefore, of the person entitled to have access 
to such data, given that all persons have the right to access their own data, which, in the field 
of personal data protection, is called “access right” (Vide Article 12 of Law 2472/1997). If it 
is accepted that the donor’s data also belong to the biological descendant thereof, in the sense 
that such data have multiple connections (i.e. they are connected both to the donor and to the 
biological descendant thereof), then the biological descendant has the right to access the data 
in question, given that they are associated to his/her person.  
 The views on the ownership status of data have their origins in the work of John 
Locke, stating that every person has the right to his/her individual sovereignty and, therefore, 
the right to control and own all products related to his person5. However, it must be noted that 
the ability to control genetic data does not automatically entail the acknowledgment of 
hereditary rights thereon, namely, industrial property rights. To avoid conceptual 
misunderstandings, it would be more accurate to say that every person has the right to 
determine his/her genetic data, arising from his/her right of informational self-determination6.  
 The case-law of foreign courts provides significant insight into data ownership. In the 
case of Moore vs Regents of the University of California7 the California Court of Appeal 
ruled that every person must have the ultimate power to control what becomes of his/her 
tissues, while acknowledging that the plaintiff, Mr. Moore, had property rights over his 
genetic material. In the case in question, Mr. Moore was submitted to a spleen removal 
operation. After the end of the operation, the doctors found that his cells had therapeutic 
properties. Without the patient’s knowledge and informed consent, they kept his spleen and 
created cell lines with specific characteristics for research-therapeutic purposes, with a view 
to their economic exploitation. Mr. Moore was asked to pay regular visits to the hospital for 
monitoring his health and taking biological material from his body. On the contrary, the 
Supreme Court of California8 ruled that Mr. Moore has no ownership rights over his 
biological material and denied the existence of liability in relation to the conversion of his 
cells. The Court held that the acknowledgment of an ownership right over genetic data is a 
political decision, which must be made by the legislator and not by the judge. This ruling 
                                                 
5 See L. Mitrou, Biobanks, research and genetic data, in: G.Maniatis-L. Mitrou, The protection of personal data, 
Sakkoula Publications, Athens-Thessaloniki 2008, p. 19 et seq. (34, footnote 40).  
6 See L. Mitrou, ibid (footnote 5), p. 37 et seq. 
7 See Moore v. The Regents of the Univ. of California, 215 Cal. App. 3d 709, 722, 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 502 
(1988). 
8 See Moore vs Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal. 3d 120; 271 Cal. Rptr. 146; 793 P.2d 479 (1990).  




made a clear distinction between the right to control genetic data and the claim for profit 
thereon9. 
 The case of the Icelandic biobank “Health Sector Database” is also worth mentioning 
when it comes to the issue of genetic information ownership. This biobank contained all 
medical data of Iceland’s population, including genetic and genealogical information for the 
genetic and epidemiological study of the Icelandic population. This interconnection led to the 
creation of a collective database, providing information on genotypes, genealogy and disease 
types. The purpose of this database was to reveal the relationship between genes and diseases, 
the pathogenesis of diseases, complications and their response to treatment. Iceland was not 
selected by chance for creating this type of biobank. The country was populated during the 
late 8th century by the Vikings and their Irish slaves and it has a small population, with low 
immigration flows. Therefore, Iceland’s population presents genetic uniformity, as two 
randomly selected individuals from the Icelandic population will have more genetically 
similar ancestors compared to two other individuals, randomly selected from a larger 
population sample10. In addition, since 1915, Iceland has a well-organized and reliable 
healthcare system. The Parliament of Reykjavik assigned to the company DeCodes Genetics, 
the task of collecting data on the 650,000 inhabitants of Iceland. The Swiss pharmaceutical 
company Hoffmann-La Roche had undertaken to pay to DeCodes Genetics the amount of two 
hundred million dollars for the exclusive use of its database in order to research twelve 
serious diseases, including schizophrenia, Alzheimer's disease, cardiovascular diseases etc.In 
addition to the serious objections formulated in relation to the issue of the participants’ 
consent, their inability to raise objections, their lack of information and the further use of their 
data, the question of concern to this paper relates to determining the owners of the collected 
data.  
In the case under consideration, namely the case of the Health Sector Database, the 
Supreme Court of Iceland11, held, in implementation of Directive 95/46/EC on personal data, 
that the father’s genetic data are also the child’s personal data. The Court acknowledged the 
                                                 
9 See Maureen S. Dorney, Moore v. the Regents of the University of California: Balancing the Need for 
Biotechnology Innovation against the Right of Informed Consent, Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1990, p. 
333 et seq. (369). 
10 See E. Mallio, The human genome, Generic research and human rights protection, Ant. N. Sakkoula 
Publications, Athens-Komotini 2004, p. 294 et seq. and footnote 668. 
11 See Icelandic Supreme Court, Ragnhildur Guðmundsdóttir vs. The State of Iceland., No. 151/2003, available 
at: http://epic.org/privacy/genetic/iceland_decision.pdf, accessed on: 14.2.2015. In this case, the applicant sought 
the recognition of her right to prohibit the transfer of health data on her diseased father to a database. The Court 
held that the applicant cannot exercise this right by acting on behalf of her deceased father, but, in view of her 
right to privacy, she has legal interest in preventing the transfer of her father’s health data to the database, as the 





applicant’s right to prevent the inclusion of the medical records of her deceased father in the 
Icelandic Data base, as it held that the father’s genetic data are also of interest to the child, as 
the latter inherits such data, in so far as they may provide useful genetic information in 
relation to the child.  
C. The importance of ownership over genetic information 
The findings made by the ruling of the Supreme Court of Iceland are very useful. 
Based on this ruling, it may be argued that the genetic data resulting from examining an 
individual may be regarded as personal data of the entire family, in so far as the members of 
this family are identifiable or have been identified12. Therefore, the parent’s genetic data are 
also the child’s genetic data and, consequently, the child has the right to access them13 under 
Article 12 of Directive 96/46/EC. In application of this ruling, which, however, cannot lead to 
safe generalizations, the child could claim a right of access to the genetic material from which 
he/she was created and, probably, the donor may have a right of access to information on the 
result of the use of his/her genetic material. However, this is a complicated matter and needs 
to be further analyzed. It must not be overlooked that the ruling of the Supreme Court of 
Iceland may have been affected by the fact that the father, whose genetic data were assessed, 
was already dead and, therefore, he was no longer covered by the right to the protection of his 
personal data14. If the father, in his capacity as the subject of the data, was still alive, one 
could reasonable argue that he would have the right to the confidentiality of his data15. This 
debate becomes even more lively if we consider that, on the one hand, an individual may own 
his/her sensitive data (in this case the father) but, on the other hand, if his/her biological 
descendants also have ownership rights over the same data, then the descendants have the 
right to obtain knowledge of such data even if they are sensitive, as they may provide 
information on their person. 
The above case-law can lead to many thoughts. Firstly, from the moment that genetic 
data is owned by someone, it follows that the owner has the right to access them. The 
question that follows is whether this access must be unlimited, thus leading to a disclosure of 
                                                 
12 See G. Laurie, Genetic Privacy-A challenge to Medico-Legal Norms, Cambridge 2002, p. 253 et seq.  
13 See R. Gertz, An analysis of the Icelandic Supreme Court judgement on the Health Sector Database Act, 2004, 
1:2SCRIPTed 241, available at: http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/issue2/iceland.asp, accessed on: 
14.3.2014. 
14 Note that the provisions of Law 2472/1997 cover the personal data of living persons [see Article 2(c) of Law 
2472/1997 in conjunction with Article 35 of the Civil Code, Opinion 4/2007 of the Group under Article 29 on 
the meaning of the term “personal data”, 20.06.2007, pp. 27-28 and, inter alia, Decisions No 100/2001 and 
32/2006 of the Authority]. Therefore, granting the sensitive personal data of a deceased person to a third-party 
[within the meaning of Article 2(i) of Law 2472/1997] does not fall within the provisions of Law 2472/1997. 
15 See the relevant analysis of Μ. Bottis, Anonymisation of Sperm Donors for Artificial Insemination: An 
International Data Protection Law Perspective, IJEIIL 2009, p. 69 et seq. (80), op. cit. 




the genetic material donor’s identity instead of a simple anonymous record, limited only to 
critical genetic information. It is considered that, in principle, the right of access cannot be 
exercised with restrictions16, namely, it cannot be restricted to an anonymous medical file as 
access relates not only to a person’s genetic background but also to its evolution, i.e. the 
current situation of the parent. Descendants must have access both to impersonal genetic 
information and to its personal dimension. It is necessary for them to have all relevant 
information on their ancestors, as it is part of them. 
In the end, the issue goes beyond the limits of legal science, as the basic underlying 
question is what the genetic elements that we actually inherit from our biological parents 
are17. The genetic material of biological parents is extremely useful to their children, as it may 
provide them with useful information on their life and evolution (e.g. predisposition to a 
specific disease).  
ΙIΙ. The right of access to genetic information 
The existence of a file is a prerequisite for implementing the legislation on the 
protection of personal data, in accordance with Article 3(1) of Directive 95/46/EC, and the 
Greek Law 2472/1997, transposing this Directive into Greek national legislation. In principle, 
the said file may only exist in the case of a fertility center or a genetic database. On the 
contrary, regardless of how much we choose to extend this concept, it would be impossible to 
consider that there is a “file” when children seek information from their own parents. In other 
words, in most cases, the mother does not keep a structured file on the identity of the child’s 
father. Therefore, the legislation on the protection of personal data does not apply to the 
father-child relationship. On the contrary, this relationship is subject to the claims arising 
from the right to personal development. This means that the child has no right of access vis-à-
vis the mother, with regard to disclosing the father’s identity. Perhaps one could argue that the 
recognition of an access right in the case of medically assisted reproduction, but not in the 
case of the parent-child relationship, would create a situation of inequality between children 
born by medically assisted reproduction and children born by natural processes, as the former 
would have more rights than the latter. In particular, children born by heterologous assisted 
reproduction will be able to exercise their right of access to the data of their biological parent, 
while children born by natural reproduction will not have the same right, e.g. when the father 
is not who the mother claims him to be. The question arises as to whether children would 
have a right to know who their biological father is when the mother had extramarital 
                                                 
16 See Κ. Ν. Christodoulou, op.cit (footnote 4), note in the margin 194-195, p. 94 et seq. 





relationships18 Assuming that children have a right to know their biological ancestors, arising 
from their right to personal development, then, if the mother had an extramarital relationship, 
children would be entitled to know that their alleged father is not their biological father. 
However, they would not be able to claim access to the biological father’s data relying on the 
legislation on the protection of personal data, as the mother holds no structured file. On the 
other hand, this finding cannot give rise to a failure to recognize the access rights of a specific 
population group that complies with the conditions for implementing the legislation on the 
protection of personal data. The fact that a specific population group is covered by the 
legislation on the protection of personal data, while another is not, constitutes a specific 
legislative choice which, nevertheless, cannot result in lifting the protection for those enjoying 
the said right for reasons of equality with those who are not. Furthermore, we must not forget 
that the non-applicability of the legislation on the protection of personal data due to the lack 
of a structured file, does not lead to a failure to protect the child but to another type of legal 
protection. It could be well argued that, for reasons of equality, children born by natural 
reproduction must have the same rights as children born by heterologous artificial 
reproduction. Therefore, if the law allows the latter to have access to information on their 
genetic material donor, the former must have the right to access their father’s identity, 
provided that the mother has presented another person as their father. In this case, there are 
clear practical difficulties with regard to discovering the truth. However, these difficulties 
cannot prevent the recognition of this right.  
IV. Issues arising due to differences in national legislation 
The right of access to the genetic material donor’s information is further reinforced 
considering the general problems related to the right of disclosure, when the disclosure of the 
donor’s identity is requested by a national of a country recognizing such disclosure as a right 
of the child, e.g. the Netherlands, but when the donor comes from a country that prohibits 
disclosure, e.g. Greece. In order to better understand this example, the question is what will 
happen if a child is born in the Netherlands, where disclosure is permitted, but the donor lives 
in Greece, where disclosure is prohibited.  
If we limit the problem to the European Union, the answer lies in Directive 95/46/EC. 
In Article 4 of the Directive, it is stipulated that the applicable law is the one of the country 
where the controller is established, namely the fertility center providing the genetic material. 
                                                 
18 Cf. P. Lee Chang, D. Buccafurni-Huber, On the Moral Asymmetry of Gametic Contributions, The American 
Journal of Bioethics 2013, 56 et seq. (56). The authors argue that when the child’s legal father knows that the 
child born is not his own child but the result of an extramarital relationship of the mother, the child does not have 
the right to be informed of the mother’s behavior. 




Therefore, in the example provided above, the applicable law is the Greek law, as the fertility 
center is established in Greece. However, the law of the country where the controller is 
established applies without prejudice to the fact that the legislation of the controller’s country 
must be in line with the general framework of the Directive.  
In my view, the failure of the controller’s country of establishment to allow for 
disclosure restricts the right of access of individuals to data with multiple connections, given 
that the parent’s genetic data are, in a broader sense, the individual’s own data. In short, the 
prohibition of disclosure constitutes a restriction of the access right enshrined in Article 12 of 
Directive 95/46/EC. Note that we are talking about a restriction and not a prohibition, given 
that the Greek law allows for access to an anonymous medical record, but not to the donor’s 
name. However, it is true that the limited access19 to the donor’s medical record does not fully 
serve the right of protection of the child, as the said right would be better served if access to 
the donor’s clinical picture was permitted. For instance, if the patient suffers from a rheumatic 
disease it would be useful to know the clinical evolution of the donor, which relates to the 
current state in which the donor is found and may be affected by the donor’s geographical 
location (northern or southern regions, humid or dry climate etc.). Therefore, the restriction of 
the right to access is not fully compatible with Directive 95/46/EC.  
In short, this argument could be summarized as follows: If the reproduction center is 
established within the EU, then Directive 95/46/EC must apply. On the contrary, if the 
reproduction center is not established within the EU, the case must be resolved using the 
provisions of private international law. According to Article 26 of the Civil Code, tort liability 
is governed by the law of the country where the offense was committed, and, consequently, 
the law of the country where the controller (i.e. the fertility center) is established shall apply. 
This rule applies without prejudice to public policy, according to Article 33 of the Civil Code.  
V. Conclusion 
The disclosure right of the genetic material donor’s identity arises from the right of 
individuals to access information in relation to their person, as established by Article 5(A) of 
the Greek Constitution (Right of Information). This right is a more specific expression of the 
general right to information, as compared to the disclosure right, whereas it constitutes a 
prerequisite for the expression of informational self-determination20. Any access to the 
individual’s personal data, which are connected to the parent’s data, must have the form of 
                                                 
19 Contrary to the right of disclosure, the right of access is not subject to any limitation. See Κ. Ν. Christodoulou, 
op.cit (footnote 4), p. 94 et seq. 
20 See P. D. Armamento/V. A. Sotiropoulos, Personal Data, Interpretation of Law 2472/1997, Sakkoula 





full access, namely it must comprise the disclosure of the genetic material donor’s identity 
and must not be restricted to an anonymous file of critical genetic information, given that 
access lies not only in an anonymous genetic record, but also in its evolution, namely the 
donor’s current state. It seems inconceivable that someone may have access to an enormous 
amount of information on one’s person but not to the identity of one’s parent. Note that the 
disclosure of the donor’s information must take place only under the condition that the 
intended donor knows, in advance, that his identity will be disclosed to the child. Therefore, 
there will be no breach of the intended donor’s privacy, as donors themselves will be able to 
decide on whether to donate their genetic material or not, knowing in advance that their 
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